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THE PHILIPPINESAND ASEAN
Optionsfor Aquino
Donald E. Weatherbee
Since February 1986 the world has closely watched
President Corazon Aquino's Philippines. Quite naturally most of the attention has been focused on the domestic struggle to institutionalize "people power" both administratively and in the process of creating a new
constitution. Observations on the foreign policy implications of the regime
change have generally dealt with discussions of the future of the U.S. military base rights in the Philippines. While the U.S.-Philippines security
relationship is important-some would even say vital-there is another set
of interdependencies that deserves attention, the Philippines as one of the
six state actors in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
Manila is slated to be the site of ASEAN's third summit meeting, now
scheduled for December 1987. An examination of the Aquino government's international behavior in the ASEAN regional framework gives
some insight into both continuities and discontinuities in Philippines foreign policy under Aquino, as well as illustrates some of the broader issues
of the dynamics of regionalism in Southeast Asia.

The Marcos Government in ASEAN
In 1967, with the Bangkok Declaration, Philippines Foreign Secretary
Narciso Ramos in association with the foreign ministers of Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand called into existence an organization
designed to provide the basis for regional economic, social, cultural, administrative, and technical cooperation. In 1976 at the first or Bali Summit, the Declaration of ASEAN Concord and the Treaty of Amity and
Cooperation in Southeast Asia provided an explicit political blueprint for
harmonizing the ASEAN nations' foreign policies. Through nineteen
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years, the Marcos government consistently promoted the ASEAN goals
and Manila's symbolic support for the organization was impressive.
In one sense, Philippines membership in ASEAN was a natural consequence of its previous engagement in earlier efforts in regionalism:
Maphilindo and the Association of Southeast Asia. The interests that the
Philippines and the other members sought to pursue through ASEAN
were both those couched in the generalities of the founding document and
those of more narrowly defined national self-interest. ASEAN gave the
Philippines a stage on which to play as an independent, sovereign Asian
nation, not a trans-Pacificappendage of the United States. It was a vehicle
for the assertion of a regional identity. Secondly, although it is often forgotten as we view the wreckage of the economy today, in 1967 the Philippines seemed to be on the brink of becoming a Southeast Asian NIC.
Manila economists and entrepreneurs saw in ASEAN an opportunity to
penetrate new markets and reduce their dependency on the traditional patterns of Philippines trade.
In terms of the workings of the organization, Manila has been generally
politically passive, particularly with respect to the Indochina crisis that
has preoccupied ASEAN since December 1978. Manila has gone along
with the ASEAN consensus, apparently not having tried to shape that
consensus or to create diplomatic and political initiatives of its own. In
part, this may be because of its sense of relative political and strategic
remoteness from the conflict, both geographically and in light of its American security linkages. Also, the Kampuchean crisis coincided with economic downturn in the Philippines and the rise of political opposition to
Marcos. Increasingly preoccupied with internal affairs in the 1980s, the
Marcos government had little political contribution to make to ASEAN.
Foreign Minister Tolentino confessed to this at the 17th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in July 1984. "While our national effort must now be concentrated in resolving critical domestic economic issues," he said, "we find it
equally self-evident that any progress on our domestic front must be
achieved in the context of continued interaction and cooperation with our
ASEAN neighbours."1
On the other hand, the Philippines has been one of the most active promoters of regional cooperative arrangements and structures in the functional areas as laid out in the original Bangkok Declaration. An
organizationally strong and regionally integrating ASEAN was set as a

1. Straits Times, 11 July 1984.
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goal by President Marcos as early as 1968.2 This led at times to a ManilaSingapore axis in ASEAN as both countries sought to move toward freer
intra-ASEAN trade. Manila has consistently been supportive of moving
ASEAN in genuinely integrative directions, sometimes-to Indonesian annoyance-acting as the organizational gadfly. Marcos was the first to call
for a third ASEAN summit in his address opening the 13th ASEAN Economic Ministers Meeting in May 1982, saying that a summit would provide "fresh impetus" for greater cooperation.3 At the February 1984
gathering of the ASEAN heads of government for the official celebration
of Brunei's independence, Marcos lobbied his counterparts for a Manila
summit. By this time, however, his efforts were seen as less directed at
strengthening ASEAN than burnishing his own political image, and
ASEAN was not prepared to go along.
The real payoffs of ASEAN membership to Marcos's government, while
growing out of the dynamic of regionalisrr, had little to do with functional
cooperation. Malaysian and Indonesian political commitment to ASEAN
in the sense of promoting regional security and harmony served to mediate
potential conflicts between the Philippines and its neighbours. The dispute
over Sabah, while serving to obstruct Malaysia-Philippines cooperation
within ASEAN, nevertheless was managed so as to avoid disrupting
ASEAN. Further, both Indonesia and Malaysia buffered the Philippines
in the Organization of the Islamic Conference and tempered OIC decisions
concerning interventions in support of the Moro insurgency. They also
were able to control the political sympathies of their own Muslim majorities with respect to the war in the southern Philippines. These issues have
been inherited by President Aquino.
Finally, for the ASEAN region, Manila's real importance had little to
do with its organizational contributions. The U.S. security umbrella over
the region was founded on the bilateral tie with the Philippines; moreover,
the credibility of that commitment was validated by the military posture
permitted by the forward basing of U.S. forces in the Philippines. The
U.S. in the Philippines became for ASEAN a vital component of the regional balance of power, particularly in light of the Vietnamese-Soviet alliance and the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea.4 The issue of the bases
2. Chin Kin Wah, The ASEAN Secretariat. Prospectsfor Reform, paper presented to a
"Workshop on Factors Affecting Regional Integration," ASEAN Economic Research Unit,
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore (17-18 December 1981), p. 1.
3. Straits Times, 21 May 1982.
4. While ASEAN officials are loathe to go on record with respect to the bases, the consistent and region-wide privately communicated view is that in the absence of a functioning
"Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality" (ZOPFAN), a termination of the U.S. base agreements would be inherently destabilizing without major alterations in the policies of the USSR
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has become an important part of the Aquino government's informal dialogue with its ASEAN partners.

ASEAN and the "People Power" Revolt
In foreign policy as in domestic policy ASEAN elites have a strong predilection for the status quo. The ASEAN leaderships are essentially conservative with respect to the modalities of change. A key word in their
political lexicon is "stability." Therefore, it is not surprising that ASEAN
leaderships generally did not react negatively to Marcos's efforts to control
events after the assassination of Senator Benigno Aquino.5 The other governments of the region share in many respects a number of those characteristics of the Marcos regime that proponents of liberal democracy find
offensive. It was the inconsistency and ineffectiveness of Marcos's repressive measures that puzzled ASEAN observers who did not differentiate
between the Filipino political culture and their own. Moreover, the popular "extra-legal" challenge to Marcos, their long-time ASEAN colleague,
had implications for the other countries in terms of possible demonstration
or spillover effects.
The prolongation of the crisis up through Marcos's call for a snap presidential election dismayed the other ASEAN members. It became obvious
that the polarization of politics in the Philippines reflected political, economic, and social cleavages that could not be bridged by adaptive concessions or even greater measures of forceful repression. The ASEAN
governments were forced to consider possible scenarios with potentially
disruptive impacts on ASEAN itself. Direct American intervention, for
example, would lead to ambivalent responses in the ASEAN publics.
Some members of the ASEAN elite would have welcomed Philippine military intervention, but this too was viewed as only sharpening the differences and sure to lead to a civil war. The growing popularity and strength
of the radical left and the New Peoples Army (NPA) as the Filipino center
was assaulted by the Marcos regime shocked ASEAN's anticommunists.
The possibility of the eventual emergence of a truly radical successor regime, which would have dramatic consequences for ASEAN and the implicit American security guarantee, could not be ruled out. Given these
possible alternatives, once it became clear that Marcos could not salvage
the situation without plunging the country into civil chaos, the ASEAN
elites realistically accepted the fact that peaceful succession with all its
and the PRC. The code words for ASEAN support of continuation of the base agreements
are an "active U.S. presence."
5. Statements about ASEAN attitudes toward the political struggle in the Philippines are
based on the author's discussions in the region in 1985 and 1986.
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policy unknowns was preferableto a Marcos attempt to retain power at all
costs.
The deterioratingsituation in the Philippines after the February 7, 1986,
elections, and particularly the increasing violence, set alarms ringing
throughout the ASEAN region. As an official in Singapore said, there had
been strong hopes that the vote would create stability, but "now we have
the worst of both worlds."6 The Jakarta Post, which often reflects Indonesian Foreign Ministry views, said there was worry that "ASEAN's cohesion and Indonesia's internal stability will be affected by the worsening
crisis."7 These and similar expressions from Kuala Lumpur and Bangkok
were officially aggregated by the ASEAN foreign ministers who, on February 23, issued a joint statement on the situation in the Philippines that was
released simultaneously in the respective capitals.
As member states of ASEAN, Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand have followed with increasing concern the turn of events
following the presidential election in the Philippines.
A critical situation has emerged which portends bloodshed and civil war.
The crisis can be resolved without widespread carnage and political turmoil.
We call on all parties to restore national unity and solidarity so as to maintain
national resilience.
There is still time to act with restraint and bring about a peaceful resolution
of the crisis.
We hope that all Filipino leaders will join efforts to pave the way for a peaceful solution to the crisis.8

Even though the foreign ministers refrained from calling upon Marcos
to step down, the fact that ASEAN formally and publicly addressed the
issue demonstrated their appreciation of the gravity of the moment. This
was a significant and unprecedented departure from the established norms
of intra-ASEAN behavior, which call for nonintervention in the affairs of
member states. The ASEAN communique was officially and unofficially
elaborated. A Thai Foreign Ministry spokesman said: "The situation in
the Philippines reflects the fact that politics in the ASEAN countries is not
like 15 to 20 years ago, when one man can dictate."9 Regional newspaper
comment was less restrained. For example, the Straits Times editorialized:
"The political crisis in the Philippines has worsened to such an extent in
6. Straits Times, 25 February 1986.
7. Jakarta Post, 24 February 1986.
8. Text as given in the Straits Times, 26 February 1986. It differs slightly from the English
translation of the Thai text as reproduced in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily
Report: Asia and Pacific (hereafter FBIS, DR/APA), 25 February 1986, p. A-1.
9. New York Times, 26 February 1986.
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the past few days that violence and bloodshed can now be avoided only if
Mr. Marcos steps down from the presidency he so questionably claimed
after the last election."10
It was, therefore, with no small sense of relief that the ASEAN capitals
learned of and welcomed the departure of Marcos for Honolulu. This was
evident in their quick and warmly-worded official congratulatory messages
to the Aquino government. It has been suggested that the sending of "congratulations" by the ASEAN states at this point, in contrast to the "recognition" accorded by the United States and Japan, implied an ASEAN
preference to see Mrs. Aquino's succession as a result of constitutional
takeover rather than revolutionary change.1I Malaysian Foreign Minister
Tengku Ahmad Rithauddin said in a statement that Malaysia was gratified
and relieved over the development and "congratulates the Filipino people
in their hour of triumph and fulfillment after such a determined and courageous struggle."12 Thailand's Prime Minister Prem, speaking on behalf of
the Thai government and people, said: "We respect and admire the Philippine people for their struggle which resulted in a peaceful change of government."13 While not disclosing the actual contents of President
Suharto's congratulatory message to Mrs. Aquino, Indonesian Foreign
Minister Mochtar admitted that the political outcome in Manila had afforded ASEAN "relative relief."14
While the other ASEAN countries welcomed the peaceful transition in
Manila, the leader of the new government was an unknown quantity in the
various capitals. Although familiar faces were seen in the government,
Enrile being most prominent, the people closest to Mrs. Aquino had not
previously been part of ASEAN's elite circles. What kind of commitment
would the Aquino government make to ASEAN? What would be her
stand with respect to national and regional "resilience" defined as internal
security? How would she deal with the Sabah question, ASEAN's perennial irritant? Finally, and in some capitals most importantly, would the
Philippines continue to contribute to the regional balance of power
through its security relationship with the United States?

10. Straits Times, 26 February 1986.
11. Hans Indorf, "People power: fallout on Asean neighbors," Far Eastern Economic Review (hereafter FEER), 27 March 1986, p. 33.
12. BERNAMA (Kuala Lumpur), 26 February 1986, in FBIS, DR/APA, 27 February
1986, p. 0-1.
13. "Voice of Free Asia," 26 February 1986, in ibid., 28 February 1986, p. J-1.
14. FBIS, DR/APA, 26 February 1986, p. N-1.
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The Aquino Government and
Commitment to ASEAN
During the presidential campaign Mrs. Aquino had pledged a special effort
to revitalize Philippine relations with ASEAN neighbors. She reiterated
the intention when, only two days after the "people power" revolt had
installed her in office, she met with ambassadors of the ASEAN countries
and promised that her government would "work closely" with the other
member states. In a sense, the new government was officially welcomed to
the ASEAN ranks when Vice-President and concurrently Foreign Minister Salvador H. Laurel joined the other ASEAN foreign ministers in Bali
at the end of April to meet with President Reagan. The major focus for
Philippine officials at that time was not ASEAN, however, for this was the
occasion for the first meeting between the new government and the most
senior U.S. officials.
Singapore's Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew was the first ASEAN leader
to meet Mrs. Aquino face-to-face in her new role during an official visit to
Manila at the end of June 1986. High on the agenda for the talks, after
preliminary and somewhat effusive expressions of mutual esteem, was
agreement on the importance of the proposed ASEAN summit in the Philippines, both intrinsically in terms of the economic issues to be addressed
and as a symbolic expression of ASEAN support for the Aquino government. The summit had been agreed upon by the end of 1985, and planning
for it was already underway at the January 1986 ASEAN senior officials
meeting in Chiangmai. The accession of Mrs. Aquino, however, gave the
planned summit a new political quality. In August, President Aquino underlined the primary ASEAN identity of the Philippines by choosing to
make her first official trip abroad to ASEAN countries-Indonesia and
Singapore. It had first been thought that she would travel to Washington,
but she was persuaded that to visit in the region first would affirm her
intention to revitalize the Philippines' ASEAN role.
President Aquino's first opportunity to reaffirm the Philippines' commitment to ASEAN in a formal structural setting came at the 19th
ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Manila on June 23, 1986. Her welcoming
speech was remarkablein that, rather than relying on the self-congratulatory platitudes that so often have marked the public presentations of high
level intra-ASEAN dialogue, Mrs. Aquino sternly recited the litany of
ASEAN's failed expectations and aspirations. Looking forward to the
planned 1987 summit, she enjoined the foreign ministers to consider how
far short of its goals of economic cooperation and progress ASEAN had
fallen and to turn to a reexamination of the kinds of problems that
threatened to render continued association meaningless. "After 19 years
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of existence," she said, "ASEAN should already be evaluating the impact
of regional economic cooperation instead of endlessly discussing how to
get it off the ground."'5
Although President Aquino's candidly critical remarks reflected frustration at the slow pace of progress shared by many in ASEAN's various
public and private constituencies, the way in which she voiced them did
not sit too well with senior ASEAN officials. As a newcomer to the ranks
of ASEAN's elite, it was felt that her "blasting" of ASEAN was inappropriate and ill-timed.16 Two months later, on August 28, she opened the
18th ASEAN Economic Ministers Meeting in Manila. While her message
was essentially unchanged, it was delivered in a more measured and moderate fashion. Mrs. Aquino said that although the ASEAN economies
have tended to go their own separate ways in pursuit of self-interest and
almost all steps that were essential to the attainment of ASEAN's objectives have failed, yet peace and stability reigned in the region. Thus, despite her admitted earlier impatience expressed at the June foreign
ministers meeting, she could now say that ASEAN would endure regardless of the speed of cooperation. The lesson she had learned in the course
of her visits to Indonesia and Singapore, she said, was that the real essence
of the association was in the region's peace and stability and the friendship
among the six members.
President Aquino's generalized call for more progress in ASEAN's economic domain was translated into a program of action that builds upon
the long-established Philippine approach to ASEAN as well as the Aquino
government's hope that greater economic interaction within ASEAN will
benefit the Philippines' faltering domestic economy. This vision, first officially unveiled during the Jakartavisit, is that of a duty-free ASEAN common market by the year 2000. The idea is vigorously pushed by Jose
Conception, Mrs. Aquino's exuberant and energetic Minister of Trade and
Industry. The proposal was expected to take center stage at the August
1986 economic ministers' meeting. As chairman of the meeting, Concepcion drove the discussions into contentious areas that, while not reflected
in the harmony of the final communique, meant that in private the ministers were forced to come to grips with functional trade policy areas critical
to substantive intra-ASEAN trade liberalization. The galvanizing princi15. The text of Aquino's speech, "Time is well past for talking," is in The Diplomatic Post
(Manila), July-September 1986, pp. 8-9.
16. The Bangkok Post, 24 June 1986, headlined its story on the Aquino speech, "Aquino
blasts ASEAN as meeting opens." It mentioned that she received "a standing ovation" when
she was introduced and "polite applause" after she finished speaking. The author's own interviews with ASEAN bureaucrats confirm the generally negative reaction to her comments.
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ple was watered down in the final communique to a noncommittal oneliner: "The concept of intra-ASEAN free trade was also discussed and will
be further studied." Concepcion renewed the Philippines-Singapore
ASEAN economic policy alliance. In his speech welcoming his ministerial
colleagues, he declared support for Singapore's proposal of the so-called
"stand-still and roll-back" approach to nontariff barriers inhibiting intraASEAN trade.17
Certainly the openness and new willingness to discuss sensitive issues in
ASEAN cooperation demonstrated at the economic ministers' meeting
was in part because of the host government's impatience with the old
ASEAN ways. This coincided with the sense of urgency felt throughout
ASEAN officialdom in preparationfor the ASEAN summit. Nevertheless,
the Philippines' enthusiasm for faster and more integrative economic progress will probably not be easily translated into consensus, let alone six
national policies. The high visibility of the Philippines in the 1986 economic forum, coincidental with the government change in Manila, was an
accident of the ASEAN conference rotation system. The consensual structure of decision making in ASEAN continues to inhibit innovation. The
accusing finger is usually pointed at Indonesia as being the most obstructive. 18 The Aquino government will be little better able than its predecessor to move ASEAN in the direction of free trade, as indicated in the
February 1987 agreement between President Suharto and Prime Minister
Lee Kuan Yew that neither a common market nor an ASEAN free trade
area should be considered at the ASEAN summit.19
As for ASEAN's function as a political/diplomatic caucus confronting
Vietnam over Kampuchea, Mrs. Aquino's government to date has followed the line of its predecessor in going along with the ASEAN consensus. Moreover, again like its predecessor, the Aquino government wants
to keep its bilateral line with Hanoi open as well as renewing the Philippines' opening to China.

The Sabah Issue
Malaysia's Prime Minister Mahathir, in offering his warmest congratulations to President Aquino, gracefully and tactfully alluded to the ongoing
bilateral dispute over sovereignty in Sabah. He said: "It is our hope that
Malaysia and the Philippines will be able to gather fresh impetus to ex17. Straits Times, 29 August 1986.
18. Jose Galang, "Beneficial for whom: Jakarta, Asean's biggest market, opposes a customs union," FEER, 18 September 1986, p. 68; "S-E Asian common market stays a dream,"
New Straits Times (Kuala Lumpur), 23 October 1986.
19. "Stressing solidarity," FEER, 19 February 1987, p. 41.
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amine various aspects of our relationship in the interest of even deeper
friendship between us."20 For a quarter of a century, since initially advanced by the Macapagal government in 1962, the Philippine claim to sovereignty over Malaysia's North Borneo Sabah state has not only irritated
bilateral relations between the two nations but has impeded ASEAN cooperative activities. Although the claim has not been actively pursued in
recent years, its continued existence blocks normal exchanges between the
two states. This has been representedsymbolically by the unwillingness of
a Malaysian prime minister to pay an official visit to the Philippines. Since
by ASEAN protocol Manila would be the next site for an ASEAN summit, the possible nonparticipation of the Malaysian prime minister is one
of the reasons why no such meeting had been scheduled since the 1977
Kuala Lumpur summit.
There had been hopes for a breakthrough at the 1977 summit when
President Marcos verbally renounced the claim, but this was never followed up by constitutional amendment or statutory enactment to provide
legal effect under Philippines law. The Philippines national territory continued to be constitutionally defined in terms of "historic right" as well as
legal title and has judicially been understood to include Sabah. The Philippine Base Line Act of 1968 (Republic Act. No. 5446) is still in force, and
states specifically (Section 2) that the Republic of the Philippines has acquired "dominion and sovereignty" over Sabah. According to Malaysia,
nothing will persuade it that the Philippines has in fact dropped the claim
but the amending of that act to exclude reference to Sabah.21
Malaysia hoped that the change in government in Manila would provide
an opportunity for putting the issue to rest once aud for all. This seemed
to be promised in April 1986 by Vice-President and Foreign Minister Laurel in his first major foreign policy statement. Referring to the Philippine
claim to Sabah, he said:
For too long has this disputebeen allowedto festerand adverselyaffectthe
relationsbetweenthe Philippinesand Malaysia. We are thereforepreparedto
undertakenew negotiationsas soon as possiblein orderto resolvethe dispute.
Ourobjectiveis to establishand maintainfriendlyand neighborlyrelationsbetweenour two countrieson the basisof good faith and mutualrespect,and in
the interestsof truth and justice for all partiesconcerned. In the process,
ASEAN wouldalso be greatlystrengthened.The finalresolutionof the Sabah
questionwould signalthe beginningof a new era in the relationsbetweenthe
20. "Malaysia's good wishes for the new Philippines government," Malaysian Digest, January-March 1986, p. 1.
21. "No definite steps by Philippines to drop Sabah claim," Malaysian Digest, 30 September 1984, p. 8.
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two countries concerned, while reinforcing the growth of closer ties and cooperation among all ASEAN members.22

This statement was welcomed by Malaysian Foreign Minister Tengku
Rithauddin who said that Malaysia was prepared to give full cooperation
to the Philippines to help that country resolve its claim. Prime Minister
Mahathir, meeting with Laurel in May 1986, emphasized that settling the
claim would not only improve bilateral relations but would also be in line
with ASEAN objectives.
Despite Manila's acknowledgement that a resolution of the Sabah claim
is a necessary condition for closer Malaysian relations, the rhetoric of reconciliation has not yet been accompanied by substantive acts of renunciation. For example, the framers of the 1986 draft constitution, adopted
overwhelmingly in the January 1987 plebiscite, consciously did not terminate the claim in the article on "National Territory."23 Although there is
no specific reference to Sabah, the provision saying Philippine lands include "all other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or
jurisdiction" would include Sabah, according to one member of the drafting commission.24
Furthermore, Laurel's purported readiness to open new negotiations
raises for Malaysia the question of what there is to negotiate. In an interview with the Sabah Times, Mrs. Aquino is quoted as saying that her government would engage in "sincere and forthright dealings" with Kuala
Lumpur in seeking a solution based on the principles of self-determination
and justice.25 This is not satisfactory to Malaysians who feel that both
self-determination and justice are already served in the framework of the
Malaysian Federation. Certainly little progress toward settlement seems
to have been made. A single secret meeting on the issue was held between
the two states in July 1986, reportedly without agreement. It can be assumed that Sabah was on the agenda for the visit of Deputy Foreign Minister Jose Ingles to Kuala Lumpur at the end of January 1987. A
subsequent "informal" visit .to Malaysia by Foreign Minister Laurel in
midyear did not lead to any breakthrough in negotiations.
22. Salvador P. Laurel, "New Directions in Philippines Foreign Policy," address delivered
before the Philippine Council for Foreign Relations, 10 April 1986, text in Foreign Relations
Journal (Manila), 1:2 (June 1986), pp. 3-4.
23. Statement by constitutional lawyer Irene Cortes, Executive Vice-President, University
of the Philippines, on the panel, "The New Constitution and the Rebuilding of Democratic
Institutions and Processes," at the conference, "A New Road for the Philippines," October
1986, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.
24. Adolfo Azeuna as quoted in the Straits Times, 27 October 1986.
25. Straits Times, 4 March 1986.
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The ambiguities of the Aquino government's approach to the Sabah issue again reflect structural continuity with the foreign policy of its predecessor. President Aquino, no more than President Marcos, can escape the
fact that the Sabah claim is bound up in the irrationalities of Filipino nationalism as well as the domestic political exigencies of Muslim politics.
Armed with a new political mandate and a popularly approved full term of
office, Mrs. Aquino might be in a position to cut through some of the
domestic interests that have kept the claim alive. But for now the Sabah
claim continues to operate to bedevil Philippines-Malaysia relations and
patterns of ASEAN cooperation. The long-awaited third ASEAN summit
was first scheduled for mid-1987, but within three months of its announcement it was pushed back to December. By then, it was hoped, the Sabah
issue would be swept away, no longer motivating Malaysia's reluctance to
grace Manila with the presence of its prime minister.

ASEAN and the U.S. Bases Issue
One item that will not be on the agenda for the projected ASEAN summit
will be the question of the future of U.S. bases in the Philippines. The
ASEAN norm of noninterference in the domestic affairs of member states
will apply once again. This does not mean that the ASEAN partners are
disinterested in the eventual outcome of U.S.-Philippines bilateral negotiations on the subject. On the contrary, it is very likely that the question of
the bases, perhaps euphemized in terms of "regional stability," will be the
subject of off-the-record,private exchanges between President Aquino and
her ASEAN counterparts. If ASEAN leaders hold true to form, their
backchannel advice to her will be similar to that they gave to Marcoscompromise with the United States and do not force a U.S. withdrawal
from the bases.
For the short term, the Aquino government's policy towards the bases is
satisfactory to ASEAN: honor the agreements in force but make no commitments in advance about the future. The fear in some ASEAN quarters
that Mrs. Aquino might give major concessions on the bases to negotiate
an any price "reconciliation" with the armed left has been dispelled.26
Furthermore, her options with respect to the bases have not been foreclosed through constitutional provisions terminating the U.S. military
presence. ASEAN is aware, however, of the fact that the new constitution
has declared the Philippines as "nuclear weapons free" and that it restricts
executive latitude in decision making on the bases. Any future agreement
26. This apprehension was expressed to the author in interviews in Indonesia, Singapore,
and Thailand in July and August 1986.
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must be ratified by the Philippines Senate, which can put it before the
electorate in a plebiscite. This obviously means that the future of the bases
will in part depend upon the outcome of an intensely polarizing internal
political debate, and at this point no one can judge that outcome. As we
approach 1988, the year prescribed for the beginning of the second fiveyear review and reassessment of the bases agreement, and then the crucial
date of September 16, 1990, the start of the one-year prior notice period
stipulated in the termination clause of the agreement, ASEAN will nervously have to wait and see.
Senior Philippine government officials are very aware of the fact that the
ASEAN partners do have security interests at stake in the outcome of the
base negotiations. Emmanuel Pelaez, currently Philippines Ambassador
to the United States, is a major figure in that process. He acknowledges
that the regional strategic balance contributes to security in Southeast Asia
and that the Philippines "cannot resolve the question solely on the basis of
her own self-interest-she must also consider the interests of her neighbors
and friends."27 More specifically:
In this endeavor,Philippineleaderscannotaffordto be parochialor insular.
Whiletheir primaryresponsibilityis to the people,they cannotdischargethat
responsibilityunlessthey deal objectivelyandjustly with the interestsof other
countrieswhichmay be affectedby our decisions,especiallyour ASEAN partners and Asian/Pacific neighbors,and the countrieswith whom we have
friendlyrelations.28
The final determinant, of course, will be Philippines national interest. On
this issue there are deep divisions of opinion, although we may say that the
perceptual gulf between the Aquino government and the kinds of opinions
articulated by the late Senator Diokno and the forces he marshalled in the
Anti-Base Coalition is not as great as that between Marcos and the Coalition. This essay on the Philippines and ASEAN is not the place to go into
the internal bases debate or to rehearse the pro- and antibase arguments,
but we can note a growing consensus within the Filipino elite that ASEAN
interests in the U.S. contribution to the regional military balance must be
more concretely expressed. Put bluntly, there is a feeling in Manila that
ASEAN has been getting a "free ride" on the U.S.-Philippines bilateral
security relationship. While enjoying the supposed benefits of regional stability supported by a balance-of-power, the other ASEAN states have not
had to pay the political, security, cultural, and other costs of having the
27. Emmanuel Peiaez, "The Military Bases in the Philippines: The Past and the Future,"
Foreign Relations Journal (Manila),

28. Ibid., p. 40.

1:1 (January 1986), pp. 30-31.
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bases. While Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia espouse foreign policies
of nonalignment, they wish the Philippines to stay aligned. While
ASEAN's declaratory policy is for a Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality (ZOPFAN), the Philippines' partners argue that until a ZOPFAN
can be realized the U.S. presence in the bases is necessary for ASEAN's
collective security.
We can discern the emergence of a policy line in Manila that insists that
there be more burden sharing of the requirements of collective securitythat the American presence be in some way dispersed. In other words,
unlike the Marcos government, the Aquino government as a member of
ASEAN does not want to be isolated with a superpower. While not a
member of the government then, Raul Manglapus expressed a growing
elite sentiment when he argued that ASEAN must come to a common
position and accept an American military presence as a joint political responsibility.29 This is a position with which a member of the government
can associate himself and add that the bases "no longer can be treated in
the context of Philippine-American bilateral relations."30 Realistically,
however, it would not seem that there is another context. Significantly,
Manglapus, who had been elected to the Senate, was named foreign minister in September 1987, succeeding Laurel who resigned and allied himself
with the right-opposition to the Aquino government.
There is no evidence that ASEAN is examining its "collective responsibility" or is looking at any concrete measures to pick up the burden in case
of the "loss" of the Philippine bases. Queries in ASEAN as to the possible
redistributionof some of the functional tasks and missions now carried out
from the U.S. bases in the Philippines are turned aside. For example, Singapore's Deputy Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong, when asked if Singapore
would be willing to provide alternative sites, replied: "Do you know the
length of the outer perimeter of Clark Air Base? The length of the outer
perimeter of Clark Air Base is 26 miles. That is exactly the length of
Singapore."31 This bit of sophistry is often favorably quoted by Singapore
officials and diplomats. It ignores the fact that facilities do exist in Singapore, as they do in every other country of ASEAN including Brunei, that
could pick up some of the slack if U.S. forces had to be redeployed from
the Philippines.
Obviously the question of "burden sharing" in ASEAN is not a question
of facilities, but of politics. As Malaysian security analyst Muthiah Alagappa put it: "Although the ASEAN states value the bases, they do not
29. Statement made at the conference, "A New Road for the Philippines."
30. Ibid. Ambassador Pelaez, responding to Manglapus.
31. Straits Times, 11 November 1985.
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want to host them."32 The political question is now even sharper as a
result of the new face of Soviet policy in Asia after Gorbachev's celebrated
July 1986 Vladivostok speech. In the speech he stated: "I would like to
say that if the U.S. were to give up its military presence in the Philippines,
let's say, we would not leave this step unanswered."33 What the Soviet
leader meant in terms of specific acts has not been specified. However,
some Filipinos have sought to link the termination of U.S. base rights in
the Philippines to negotiations for a reduction of the Soviet presence in
Vietnam, explicitly casting these moves as steps toward the realization of
ZOPFAN, thus generalizing, in a very different way, the superpower context for the ASEAN states. The ASEAN response to what might be called
the Gorbachev fishing expedition has been extremely cautious. For
ASEAN, the proof of Soviet intentions is to be found in the USSR's continued support for Vietnam's invasion of Kampuchea.
Most ASEAN analysts would realistically conclude that the prospect for
a nuclear weapons-free ZOPFAN, in which security equidistance from the
superpowers can be maintained, is embedded in the global strategic relationship between the superpowers. Until the ZOPFAN can be translated
from a declaratory policy to an operational regional regime, and as long as
ASEAN finds it necessary for the United States to be a military actor in
the regional balance, a forced relocation of the U.S. bases from Southeast
Asia would be destabilizing. Even so, accepting that certain ASEAN
states-Thailand and Singapore-might be willing to provide some necessary facilities for U.S. deployments to the region from, say mid-Pacific bases, there would be no collective ASEAN response to a termination of U.S.
base rights in the Philippines.

The Philippines and National Resilience
One of the most important shared perceptions in ASEAN is that the major
threats to its security and stability are internal. Historically, every
ASEAN state has faced the problem of armed insurgency. One of the
common experiences often cited as leading to the formation of ASEAN
was the struggle against armed communism. The ASEAN states have
sought to deal with internal threat through the application of measures of
"national resilience," a term that has come to mean the planned mobilization of the social, economic, ideological, cultural, and security forces of the
state in a politically integrative manner in a developing and equitable econ32. Muthiah Alagappa, US-ASEAN Co-operation: Limits and Possibilities, ISIS Research
Note (Kuala Lumpur: Institute of Strategic and International Studies, 1986), p. 24.
33. CurrentDigest of the Soviet Press, 38:30, 27 August 1986.
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omy.34 In the logic (ideology) of ASEAN it is both the level of "national
resilience" and the pattern of ASEAN cooperation that defines "regional
resilience." For ASEAN leaders, the final years of the Marcos government failed the test of "national resilience." The question now is whether
President Aquino can get the Philippines back on track so that peace and
stability is restored and the Philippines can again contribute to "regional
resilience."
What can ASEAN do to assist in building "national resilience" in the
Philippines? The ASEAN states have given Mrs. Aquino political support, unhesitatingly and fully accepting the legitimacy of her government.
And their token measures of economic and technical assistance have symbolically demonstrated an ASEAN-wide commitment to the Philippines
recovery. On the other hand, as noted above, there seems little possibility
that ASEAN will restructureitself so as to promote a larger Filipino share
in the ASEAN markets. Perhaps ASEAN's greatest economic contribution to "national resilience" in the Philippines will come through its bloc
leverage in the ASEAN "dialogues" with Japan, the United States and the
European Economic Community. With ASEAN, the Philippines need not
deal in isolation with its main trading partners. There even may be a kind
of perversely beneficial spillover into ASEAN in connection with the need
to restructure Manila's international economic ties. For example, other
ASEAN countries also suffer from debt burden, particularly yen-denominated debt, and there would be strong pressure to generalize relief measures for the Philippines to other member states.
With respect to the coercive or suppressive aspects of "national resilience"-that is, directly addressing the problem of growing communist and
NPA strength in the Philippines-there is little the other ASEAN states
can do other than offer advice from their own successful counter-insurgent
struggles. There is no question that they are concerned. In every face-toface bilateral meeting President Aquino has had with ASEAN leaders the
problem of the communist insurgency has been high on the agenda.
ASEAN leaders have been both troubled and heartened by the Aquino
approach. They were troubled by the ceasefire and negotiations with the
armed left because they felt only the government would be willing to make
concessions. They were heartened by continuity in leadership of the security forces, particularly Gen. Ramos who is well known to his ASEAN
counterparts. The collapse of the peace talks was not unexpected and, to
34. The term "national resilience" (ketahanan nasional as it is used throughout ASEAN
today was first coined in Indonesia in the 1960s. It was popularized by President Suharto and
propagated in the ASEAN region by Indonesia officials. It has now lost its specifically Indonesian reference and appears in ASEAN-wide rhetoric.
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the extent that it galvanized the regime into greater efforts in the field
against the insurgents, may have been welcomed in other ASEAN security
circles. While the doctrines of "national" and "regional resilience" minimize reliance on external assistance, more active and direct American security assistance to the Philippines in the war against the insurgents, if it
should be deemed necessary, would be politically acceptable to ASEAN.

Conclusion
Leaders in ASEAN realize that the consensual structure of the Association
of Southeast Asian Nations probably could not accommodate a radical
nationalist or socialist member state. The Aquino government as it is currently constituted, while dramatically different in style from most of its
ASEAN partners, has essentially the same world view and developmental
orientations as the other ASEAN states. It does not represent political
discontinuity in the ASEAN regime. As we have suggested above, the
interests pursued in ASEAN by Manila under President Aquino are not all
that differentfrom the interests promoted through ASEAN by the Marcos
government. The Philippines crisis was the first major test of the impact of
regime change on the workings of ASEAN. The way in which ASEAN
adapted to the transfer of power in the Philippines bodes well for future
transfers of power in other states as long as new leaderships share the values underpinning what might be called the political economy of ASEAN.
Ironically, however, President Aquino's promise of a revitalization of
the Philippines' commitment to ASEAN occurs at a time when ASEAN
itself is drifting, looking for a new blueprint. The upcoming Manila summit is seen as an opportunity to revitalize ASEAN. Perhaps at the site of
"people power" a new ASEAN political will power can be demonstrated.

